Some Remarks on Indicative Conditionals by Abbott, Barbara
Some Remarks on Indicative Conditionals 
Barbara Abbott 
Michigan State University 
1. Introduction 
This paper concerns indicative conditionals, such as the English examples in (1): 
(1) a. If Lynn was at the meeting, she knows what's going on. 
b. If we leave now, we can make the 5:00 show. 
c. If it rains tomorrow, we won't have a picnic. 
We wi1 look at several theories of indicative conditionals grouped into three 
categories: those that base its semantics on its logical counterpart (the material 
conditional); intensional analyses, which bring in alternative possible worlds; and 
a third subgroup which denies that indicative conditionals express propositions at 
all. We will also look at some problems for each kind of approach. 
2. The Material Conditional Analysis 
There is a long tradition that associates natural language indicative conditionals 
with the material conditional of propositional logic. (Indeed, introductory logic 
texts typically assume this identification.) The semantics of the material 
conditional is given entirely by its truth table, shown in (2). 
(2) p q p� q 
T T T 
T F F 
F T T 
F F T 
On this account natural language indicative conditionals express a truth function 
of their component sentences. 
2.1 .  Problems for the Material Conditional Approach 
There are several problems for this approach. One stressed by Edgington (1995, 
2003) is the following: assigning indicative conditionals the material conditional 
truth function means failing to distinguish between unequally probable 
conditionals with equally improbable antecedents, like those in (3) (from Jackson 
197911991, 115): 
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a. If the sun doesn't come up tomorrow it won't matter. 
b. If the sun doesn't come up tomorrow it will be the end of the world. 
In particular, our confidence that the antecedent of (3a) is false does not match or 
lack of confidence that the whole conditional is true. 
Another problem arises when conditionals are denied. It is hard to see (4a) 
as truth-conditionally equivalent to (4b). 
(4) a. It's not true that if the sun explodes tomorrow the earth won't be 
affected. 
b. The sun will explode tomorrow and the earth will be affected. 
And what's worse is that this analysis would make available a number of proofs 
of the existence of God. Two are given in (5) and (6): the first from Michael 
Jubien (personal communication, c. 1975), and the second, less pious, version 
attributed to W.D. Hart by Edgington (1986, 37, n. 6). 
(5) i. 
ii. 
. 
· . 
(6) 1. 
11. 
· . 
If God doesn't exist, then it's not the case that if I'm evil, I'll be 
punished after I die. 
I'm not evil! 
God exists . 
If God doesn't exist, then it's not the case that if I pray, my prayers 
will be answered (by Him). 
I do not pray 
God exists. 
It may be small comfort that we can also prove that God doesn't exist anymore, as 
in (7), from Hom 1989, 378). 
(7) 1. It's not the case that if God is dead. everything is permitted. 
. 
· . God is dead and something is forbidden . 
The trouble is that negation of a conditional seems typically to be merely 
understood either as negating the perceived connection between antecedent and 
consequent, or (depending on the example) as skipping over the antecedent to 
negate the consequent directly. (The latter reading, as we shall see below, might 
be derivable conversationally from the former interpretation.) In any case 
negation of a conditional seems rarely to be understood as asserting the 
antecedent and denying the consequent. 
2.2. Jackson 's Conventional Implicature 
Jackson (1979/1991, 1987) proposes a modified version of the material 
conditional analysis, on which indicative conditionals convey, in addition to their 
. truth conditions, a conventional implicature (in the sense of Grice 1975) to the 
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effect that the assertion as a whole is robust with respect to the antecedent. The 
idea is that the speaker signals their confidence that, should the antecedent prove 
to be true, their utterance as a whole will also be. In effect this robustness 
gravitates to the consequent, since if the antecedent is true the only way for the 
whole conditional to be true is for the consequent to be true as well. Although 
this proposed implicature deals only with confidence in truth values, it would 
conversationally implicate some knowledge on the part of the speaker, standing 
behind the robustness. 
Jackson's analysis appears to solve Edgington's problem: the conventional 
implicature associated with (3a) will be very different from that associated with 
(3b), accounting for the difference between them. However it is not so clear that 
Jackson's approach can solve the second problem. It appears that in (4), the 
negation is applying to Jackson's conventional implicature, rather than the truth 
conditions of the conditional. That would be expected if the negation in (4) were 
a metalinguistic one (cf. Horn 1985) . However there doesn't seem at this point to 
be any reason to think that this negation must be metalinguistic - that it couldn't 
be an ordinary sentence negation. And in that case it should be negating truth 
conditions, which gives us line two of the truth table in (2) . (We will return to 
this issue below, however.) 
3. Possible Worlds (Intensional) Analyses 
We have so far ignored subjunctive conditionals such as those in (8): 
(8) a. If Lynn had been at the meeting, she would know what's going on. 
b. If we were to leave now, we would be able to make the 5:00 show. 
c. If it were to rain tomorrow, we would not have a picnic. 
Typically, though not always, conditionals with subjunctive morphology involve 
antecedents which are presumed to be false of the actual or utterance world. They 
are usually viewed as intensional, and as involving implicit reference to 
alternative possible worlds. The idea behind a number of proposals (cf. e.g. 
Stalnaker 1968, Stalnaker & Thomason 1970, Lewis 1973) is that there is some 
kind of ordering, or selection function, on possible worlds in terms of their 
similarity to the actual world or the world of evaluation. The truth value of 
sentences like those in (8) depend, in a given world of evaluation, on the truth or 
falsity of the consequent in the closest world or worlds to the evaluation world 
where the antecedent is true. 
3.1. Stalnaker's Theory 
Stalnaker (1975) proposed assigning indicative conditionals basically the same 
semantic interpretation as sUbjunctive conditionals. He introduced the idea of a 
CONTEXT SET of worlds, among which the selection function should find its value 
if possible. The idea is that this context set comprises those worlds which are 
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consistent with the common ground - the set of beliefs which the speaker acts as 
if she assumes are shared between herself and her addressee. The difference 
between indicative and subjunctive conditionals, then, is that with subjunctive 
conditionals it is understood that the selection function may need to go outside the 
context set. "I take it that the subjunctive mood in English .. .is a conventional 
device for indicating that presuppositions are being suspended" (Stalnaker 1975, 
145). (Stalnaker 1984 discusses the difference between indicative and 
subjunctive conditionals at much greater length, with a less clear outcome. Cf. 
also Lycan 2001, who proposes an approach similar to that of Stalnaker 1975.) 
3.2. Digression: Domain Restrictor if-clauses 
Before introducing Kratzer's analysis, we should briefly mention another 
consideration. David Lewis, who was generally a supporter of the extensional 
approach to indicative conditionals, pointed out that, at least in some cases, the 
material conditional analysis of if clauses is definitely not going to work (Lewis 
1975). These involve "adverbs of quantification", e.g. always, usually, never, 
which, Lewis argued, quantify over cases. (9a) is equivalent to (9b), but (lOa) 
and (lIa) are not equivalent to (lOb) and (lIb). 
(9) a. If it rains, I always take an umbrella. 
b. Vc [It-rains (c) � I-take-umbrella (c)] 
(10) a. If it rains, I never take an umbrella. 
b. Vc -, [It-rains (c) � I-take-umbrella (c)] 
(11) a. If it rains, I usually take an umbrella. 
b. Most c [It-rains (c) ::> I-take-umbrella (c)] 
(lOb) would be true only if it's always raining, and (lIb) is satisfied by any world 
in which most cases are not rainy ones. In the light of examples like these, Lewis 
proposed that the ifin examples (9a)-(lla) be taken as a meaningless marker of a 
clause which serves as a restriction on the adverbial quantifier (Lewis 1975, 11). 
We can represent this as (9c)-(llc), below: 
(9) c. [Vc: It-rains (c)] [I-take-umbrella (c)] 
(10) c. [Vc: It rains in c] -, [I-take-umbrella (c)] 
(11) c. [Most c: It-rains (c)] [I-take-umbrella (c)] 
Treating the if clause this way gets the truth conditions right. 
(Parenthetical remark: Higginbotham (l985) pointed out another group of 
troublesome examples, where the if clause seems to serve as part of the restriction 
on a nominal quantifier. Consider (l2a) and (13a) below. Their truth conditions 
are not given by the formulas in b: (12b) requires that all students goof off and 
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fail, while (13b) would be true wherever non-students outnumber students. 
Instead, the formulas in c, which match the sentences where the if clauses are 
replaced by explicit nominal modifiers in d, seem better. 
(12) a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
(13) a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
No student will succeed if he goofs off. [= von Fintel & Iatridou· 
2002, ex. 2.] 
['v'x: student (x)] .., [x goofs off::J x will succeed] 
['v'x: student (x) & goofs off (x)] .., [x will succeed] 
No student who goofs off will succeed. 
Most students in this program succeed if they work hard. [= 
Higginbotham 1985, ex. 23a.] 
[most x: student (x)] [x works hard::J x succeeds] 
[most x: student (x) & works hard (x)] [x succeeds] 
Most students who work hard succeed in this program. 
However Dekker 2001, and von Fintel & Iatridou 2002 have pointed out that this 
analysis won't work in general. For one thing, we can have this type of if-clause 
with a proper name, which won't accept restrictive modification, as in (14) 
(14) Derek succeeds if he works hard. [= Dekker 200t, ex. 20.] 
And even when the modified nominal is quantificational, the relative clauses carry 
existence presuppositions not shared by the if clauses. The pairs below are not 
equivalent. . 
(15) a. Exactly three students succeed if they work hard. [= Dekker 2001, 
ex. 24.] 
b. Exactly three students who work hard succeed. 
(16) a. Most, but not all, of the students will succeed if they study hard. [= 
von Fintel & Iatridou 2002, ex. 38] 
b. Most, but not all, of the students who study hard will succeed. 
Von Fintel and Iatridou advocate a revised version of Stalnaker's approach which 
will solve the problems in (12) and (13). Dekker supports a return to the material 
conditional within his own brand of dynamic semantics, which he argues can also 
solve these problems.) 
3.3. Kratzer's Analysis 
Kratzer (1986/1991), following up on earlier work, declared that not only is if a 
mirage in the explicitly adverbial cases, but also in all other cases as well. Her 
nice bold statement has been frequently quoted: 
The history of the conditional is the story of a syntactic mistake. 
There is no two-place if. .. then connective in the logical forms of 
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natural languages. if-clauses are devices for restricting the domains of 
various operators (Kratzer 1986, 11). 
We have already seen how this analysis works for the explicitly adverbial cases. 
Kratzer had proposed that even simple indicatives have implicit modal operators, 
so that an example like (1a) would be given an analysis as in (17): 
(17) [must: Lynn was at the meeting] Lynn knows what's going on 
The function of the if clause is to restrict the domain of the modal operator must. 
The net result is somewhat similar to the Stalnaker semantics for conditionals -
(17) is true in a world w if and only if the consequent clause (Lynn knows what's 
going on) is true in all those worlds accessible from w where the antecedent 
(Lynn was at the meeting) is true. 
3.4. Problems for the Intensional Analyses 
3.4.1. Edgington's Objection. Edgington gives the following problem for 
intensional approaches to indicative conditionals, which she views as decisive: if 
we assign indicative conditionals truth conditions on which conditionals with 
false antecedents may sometimes be true and sometimes false, we fail to explain 
the equivalence of disjunctions of the form p or q with indicative conditionals of 
the form ifnot p then q, as in (18) (from Stalnaker 197511991, 136): 
(18) a. Either the butler or the gardener did it. 
b. If the butler didn't do it, the gardener did. 
On the material conditional analysis (18a) and (18b) are logically equivalent. 
(This assumes what nobody disputes, that we equate English either-or with 
logical disjunction, and English sentence negation with logical negation.) 
However on the possible worlds analysis (18a) could be true while (18b) is false. 
(This would be the case if the butler did it, but in the closest world in which he 
didn't, the gardener didn't do it either.) 
Edgington's objection is a general one, and bears similarities to occasional 
proofs that English indicative conditionals must have the semantics of the 
material conditional (cf. e.g. Hanson 1991). Of course Edgington does not draw 
that conclusion; we will return to her view below. In any case, I have given 
another, somewhat less abstract, problem for the intensional view, which is that it 
does not adequately distinguish indicative conditionals from SUbjunctive 
conditionals. 
3.4.2. The Snodgrass Affair. Consider the following situation: We have received 
a number of letters about the water shortage. Almost all of them were 5 pages or 
less, and all of those received an answer. One letter (from Byram Snodgrass) was 
5 pages plus a few words, and the last letter was 8 pages. We did not reply to the 
last two letters. The 8-page one was just too long to consider, and Byram 
Snodgrass is a crank who has been writing incoherent letters to us about 
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everything under the sun ever since we took on the post of Water Commissioner. 
We never answer his letters. Actually this letter of Byram's only went onto the 
sixth page because he added a PS: "If you answer this letter I'll stop writing to 
you." That made us stop and think, but in the end we threw his letter in the trash 
like all his other letters. 
Byram called our office to find out whether his letter had been sent a 
reply. Based on the truth in (19), 
(19) Every letter no longer than 5 pages was answered. 
we said (20): 
(20) If your letter was no longer than 5 pages, it was answered. 
Our reply was truthful. 
There is a sharp contrast between the true indicative conditional in (20) 
and the corresponding subjunctive conditional in (21), which is not true: 
(21) If your letter had been no longer than 5 pages, it would have been 
answered. 
As noted, we never answer letters from Byram Snodgrass. Analyses of 
subjunctive conditionals like that of Stalnaker 1968 and Lewis 1973 seem to give 
the right tnith conditions for (21). In those analyses, we look at the closest world 
or worlds where the antecedent of a subjunctive conditional is true, and see 
whether the consequent is true or not. In any of those nearby possible worlds 
where Byram's letter was not quite 5 pages long, it still did not receive an answer. 
Analyses of indicative conditionals which assign them truth conditions 
similar to those assigned to SUbjunctive conditionals, and so only consider 
situations in which the antecedent is true even if this involves considering 
nonactual possibilities, cannot distinguish between (20) and (21) and hence 
cannot be correct. The problem with such analyses is that they do not capture the 
fact that indicative conditionals are always about the actual world, whether their 
antecedents are true or false. Subjunctive conditionals, on the other hand, involve 
consideration of hypothetical situations, which may or may not be actual. 
3.4.3. Snodgrass vs. Oswald. The examples in (22) and (23), adapted by Lewis 
(1973, 3) from examples given by Adams (1970, 90), are frequently given to 
illustrate the difference between indicative conditionals and SUbjunctive 
conditionals. 
(22) If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did. 
(23) If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, then someone else would have. 
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It is quite easy to see that one could hold (22) to be true and (23) to be false. 
Nevertheless these examples do not make the case I wanted to make. Several 
factors combine to make them unsuitable. One is that there are two different 
ways to conceive of the antecedent being true, that is, to conceive of it being the 
case that Oswald did not kill Kennedy. One is to imagine that the crime was 
committed, but that Oswald did not do it. The other is to imagine that the crime 
never took place. When we are considering (22), we are considering the first sort 
of situation and when we consider (23) we are considering the second. Also, 
when we consider (22) we consider the actual world (I would say we are forced to 
consider only the actual world, because this is an indicative conditional), and we 
can do that because there must always be some small doubt about whether 
Oswald was the murderer (and for some people, of course, there is a lot of doubt). 
However there can be no doubt that the crime was committed, so for (23) we 
consider a quite different possible world in which the crime never took place. 
In short, for the Oswald examples there are two different ways to imagine 
the antecedent being true, one of which could hold in the actual world, and the 
other of which could not. So analyses like those of Stalnaker, Lycan, and Kratzer 
can account for the difference between them while still only considering 
situations in which the antecedent is true - an actu(ll situation for (22) and a 
hypothetical, nonactual one for (23). For the Snodgrass examples, on the other 
hand, the antecedent is not ambivalent in this way. Instead, the antecedent of the 
indicative conditional is false at the actual world, but we still judge the whole 
conditional to be true. For the subjunctive version, on the other hand, we must 
consider alternative possible worlds in which the antecedent is true, and there it is 
false because the consequent is still false. (See Gibbard 1980 for a somewhat 
similar conclusion. However I would differ with Gibbard's claim that indicative 
conditionals are 'epistemic'.) 
4. Non-Truth-Conditional Approaches 
We seem to have reached an impasse. There seem to be crushing problems for 
both the material conditional analysis and the possible worlds type of approach. 
Indeed, Edgington 2003 argues that no truth conditional approach to indicative 
conditionals can work. The reason is that any such approach will have to either 
agree with the truth table in (2), or disagree (and the disagreement will be with the 
bottom half, since everyone agrees on the top half). The material conditional 
analysis, of course, agrees with the truth table. However, as noted above, it does 
not accord with our intuitions about sentences like those in (3), repeated here: 
(3) a. If the sun doesn't come up tomorrow it won't matter. 
b. If the sun doesn't come up tomorrow it will be the end of the world. 
On the other hand the possible worlds approach, which disagrees with the bottom 
half of the truth table, does not accord with our intuitions about the relation 
between sentences like (I8a) and (I8b). Although I've given another problem for 
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the possible worlds approach, Edgington's argument would apply more generally 
to any approach which disagrees with the material conditional analysis. 
Edgington's conclusion is that indicative conditionals do not have truth 
conditions. Let us turn to a couple of alternatives that share the feature of not 
assigning truth conditions to conditionals. 
4.1. Belnap's Assertability Approach 
In a footnote to his discussion of adverbs of quantification (Lewis 1975, lIn), 
Lewis pointed out how one could force if to behave properly in the examples in 
(10) and (11), repeated here: 
(10) If it rains, I never take an umbrella. 
(11) If it rains, I usually take an umbrella. 
The trick is to ignore the bottom half of the material conditional truth table. 
Lewis noted that Belnap (1970) had sketched such an analysis, one which regards 
utterances of if-then sentences as conditional assertions of the consequent, rather 
than assertions of a conditional statement, especially one with the truth conditions 
of the material conditional. (Lewis called the analysis 'far-fetched', but some 
pretty down-to-earth types (Belnap cites Quine ( 1950, 21)) have spoken out in its 
favor.) Rather than giving truth conditions, Belnap focuses on assertion 
conditions for conditionals; One version is given in (24): 
(24) If A is true, then what ["If A then B"] asserts is what B asserts. If A 
is false, then ["If A then B"] is nonassertive. ["" Belnap 1970, ex. 1.] 
Omitting details, we can see that this approach will have the effect of allowing a 
negation, as well as other sentence modifiers, to skip over the antecedent clause 
and go directly to the consequent. But that resolves the problem with the adverbs 
of quantification. They will apply only with respect to cases in which the if­
clause is true - for (10) and (11), to cases in which it rains. Of those none, or 
most, must be ones where I take an umbrella, which is the result we want. 
As noted, Lewis called this approach 'far-fetched', and apparently thought 
it cost more than retaining a uniform analysis for if-clauses was worth. (His 
conclusion was to recognize in effect an ambiguity between if as a marker of 
adverbial restrictors and if as a sentential connective.) However others have 
viewed this line as attractive, and Edgington's preferred approach has some of the 
same features. 
4.2 The 'Suppositional' Theory 
Edgington, following Adams (1965, 1966, 1975), supports a 'suppositional 
theory', which is similar to Belnap's approach in many respects, but which 
addresses instead our mental processing of conditionals. (Cf. also Gibbard 1980.) 
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The idea, following Ramsey 1929, is that in assessing lfp then q, we typically do 
not know whether or not p and whether or not q. The frequently quoted statement 
in (25) is often called 'the Ramsey test': 
(25) If two people are arguing 'If p, will q?' and both are in doubt as to p, 
they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and 
arguing on that basis about q.. .. We can say they are fixing their 
degrees of belief in q given p. (Ramsey 1931, 247; cited in Gibbard 
1980, 227.) 
So, to evaluate the conditional claim we addp to the pool of our beliefs and then 
consider whether or not, on that supposition, q would be the case. We are in 
essence comparing the probability of q given p with the probability of not-q given 
p. Edgington urges us to give up the search for truth conditions for indicative 
conditional sentences, and instead base our analysis of them on their role in our 
beliefs, as sketched by Ramsey. In particular, and with respect to the material 
conditional analysis, she is convinced by the disconnect between our judgement 
of examples like (3a), which we regard as very improbable, and our judgement of 
the antecedent, which we judge to be highly probable. On the material 
conditional analysis these judgements should match. 
Where the possible worlds approaches inake the troublesome bottom half 
of the material conditional truth table non-truth functional, these new strategies, in 
essence, delete it. Edgington notes that "it is compatible with T3 [the 
suppositional theory] to say that 'if A, C' is . . .  neither truth nor false if A is false" 
(Edgington 2003, 387). On Belnap's approach 'if A,  C' would be "nonassertive" 
in that circumstance. 
In the following sections I would like to suggest some problems for these 
approaches. 
4.3. Problems for the Non-Truth-Conditional Approaches 
4.3.1. Are Probability Judgements to be Trusted? As just noted, in defending the 
suppositional theory against the truth conditional approaches, Edgington puts 
great weight on the importance of our judgements of conditional probabilities. 
This seems to accord well with the fact that typically, when conditionals are 
uttered, neither speaker nor addressee knows the truth value of either the 
antecedent or the consequent. (As Edgington remarks, God doesn't have any use 
for ordinary indicative conditionals (Edgington 2003, 385).) And as the Ramsey 
test suggests, we do that by judging the probability of the conclusion on the 
condition that the antecedent holds. As noted above, these judgements can 
conflict sharply with what our judgements should be given the material 
conditional analysis. 
The suggestion I want to make here is that human judgements about 
probabilities are not that good, and so maybe should not be taken so seriously as 
the basis of a semantic analysis. Tversky & Kahneman (1983) have shown, in a 
number of experiments, that most people, even doctoral students in Decision 
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Science at Stanford University, given the right sort of background story, will 
judge it more likely that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank 
teller. That is, in effect, they judge (26) to be true. 
(26) It is more likely that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a 
bank teller. 
Nevertheless we would not want to reappraise our view of the semantics of words 
like likely given this very widespread human failing. Instead we should look 
elsewhere to explain this divergence. By the same token, it might be more 
profitable to look for another explanation for our judgements about (3a) and its 
antecedent. 
4.3.2. True (and Assertable) Conditionals with False Antecedents. Both the 
suppositional approach and the assertability approach only consider situations in 
which the antecedent of a conditional is true, in evaluating the conditional as a 
whole. But there are at least three kinds of cases in which we do want to consider 
conditionals with false antecedents. One is the Snodgrass case given above as a 
counterexample to possible worlds approaches. The suppositional and 
assertability approaches do not fare any better with example (20) than did the 
possible worlds views: on the assertability approach (20) was unassertable by us, 
and on the suppositional approach it lacks a truth value. 
A second kind of problematic case is presented by a class of conditionals 
whose whole purpose in life is to convey the falsity of the antecedent. Assertions 
like (27) 
(27) If that's a real diamond, I'll eat my hat. 
invite the addressee to conclude, from the obvious falsity of the consequent, that 
the antecedent must also be false. Such sentences are very useful for lively 
denials of somebody else's (explicit or implicit) claims. Both the assertability 
approach and the supposition theory make such uses inexplicable. In case the 
antecedent is false, which is the very occasion one wants to use a monkey's uncle 
sentence, the utterance as a whole could not make an assertion (in Belnap's view), 
or would not have a truth value (on Edgington's view). 
The mechanism involved in (27) is modus tollens (from If A then C and 
not C, we may conclude not A). This argument form in and of itself is the third 
kind of case causing problems for both of these theories. Consider the 
conversation in (28): 
(28) A: If Mary is home the lights will be on. 
B: The lights aren't on. 
On the assertability approach, if we accept B' s utterance as true, we must 
conclude either that A's utterance is false, or that A failed to make an assertion at 
all. On the suppositional approach, accepting B' s utterance means A said 
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something false or truth valueless. In neither case does it seem that we can use 
A's utterance to conclude that Mary is not at home. Yet that seems to be the 
natural conclusion that we should draw, especially if we have reason to believe 
that what A said isn't false. 
4.4. Intermediate Conclusions 
Let us pause to consider where we are. We have seen basically three types of 
approaches to indicative conditionals. The material conditional analysis runs into 
problems with false-seeming conditionals that have false, or probably false, 
antecedents, as well as with negated conditionals. However Frank Jackson's 
conventional implicature gave us some hope that these problems could be gotten 
around. The possible worlds approaches fail to account for our judgements of 
logical equivalence between certain conditionals and corresponding disjunctions, 
and also do not adequately distinguish indicative from subjunctive conditionals. 
The assertability and supposition approaches do not do well with a variety of true 
conditionals with false antecedents: Snodgrass type examples, monkey's uncle 
sentences and other, more ordinary, instances of modus tollens. To me, the 
material conditional approach is seeming like the best bet, but there is another 
factor to consider. 
5. Grammatical asymmetry 
The considerations in the previous section were intended to lend support to the 
idea of reconsidering the material conditional analysis of indicative conditionals. 
However there is another factor which needs to be taken into account - one which 
has not received much attention, at least in the philosophical literature. The 
material conditional analysis stresses the similarity in truth conditions between 
indicative conditionals and logically equivalent conjunctions and disjunctions. 
The equivalent forms are given in (29), and illustrative examples in (30). 
(29) a. 
b. 
c. 
(30) a. 
b. 
c. 
If A then C. 
Not A or C. 
Not (A and not C). 
If Sue comes to the party then George will too. 
Either Sue won't come to the party or (she will and) George will too. 
It won't be that Sue comes to the party and George doesn't. 
However there is a grammatical difference between sentences like (30a) and those 
like (30b) and (30c), which reflects a grammatical difference between if on the 
one hand, and or and and on the other.l The difference is that or and and are 
coordinating conjunctions (as we used to say in elementary school grammar 
classes) while if is subordinating. That means that grammatically, the if clause in 
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(14a) is a sentential modifier, rather than a clause of equal grammatical standing 
to its partner. 
Grammatical indications of this subordinate status are not hard to find. If 
clauses can be moved around - to the other side of their consequents, or 
embedded within them, as shown in (31). 
(31) a. 
b. 
George will come to the party, if Sue does. 
George, if Sue comes to the party, will also come. 
The same cannot be done in the other cases - indeed we don't even speak of 
either-clauses, or and-clauses. 
(32) a. * Or George will come to the party, either Sue won't. 
b. * It won't be that and George, Sue comes to the party, doesn't. 
This grammatical difference does not exist in the logical correspondents, which 
are all coordinating connectives in the grammatical sense. 
Given the asymmetry in grammatical status between antecedent and 
consequent of a conditional, we would expect to find a difference in their 
contribution to truth conditions (assuming for the moment that conditionals have 
truth conditions). In the typical case with sentence adverbials, it is the adverbial 
element that is the new assertion in the utterance, the rest of the sentence being 
presupposed or backgrounded. This is true of the unmarked use of examples like 
those in (33): 
(33) a. Lee repaired the machine with great difficulty. 
b. Fred bought the lamp because the old one was broken. 
However this is, of course, not true in the case of if-clauses, probably because 
they tend to give prior or background conditions relative to which the consequent 
is said to hold. (The terms "antecedent" and "consequent" reflect that fact.) Thus 
it would not make sense to presuppose the consequent while asserting the 
antecedent. But that means that the focus will be on the main clause, in the case 
of a conditional. 
There are other facts about indicative conditionals which fall into place 
once this grammatical asymmetry is recognized. One is the possibility of 
'consequent' clauses that are in interrogative or imperative form, as in (34): 
(34) a. If Lynn is there, give her this envelope. 
b. If Lynn is there, will there be enough spinach? 
This latter fact suggests that if-clauses are root modifiers, in some sense. 
Compare also the frequently noted 'illocutionary' type of examples, as in (35). 
(35) If you'd like a beer there are some in the fridge. 
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Here it seems clear· that the if-clause places a condition on the relevance or utility 
of the speech act which follows . 
. This being the case, it in tum suggests an explanation for the frequently 
noted fact that conditional sentences often do not embed as naturally as 
conjunctions or disjunctions. Compare the following: 
(36) a. Either Kim will stay and Fred will go, or Kim will go and Fred will 
stay. 
b. # If Kripke was there if Strawson was, then Anscomb was there. [= 
Gibbard 1980, ex. 35] 
c. # Either if you open box A, you'll get ten pounds, or if you open box 
B, you'll get a button. [ex. from Edgington 1995, 283] 
We have no trouble processing (36a) but (36b) and (36c) are pretty awkward. 
Although the grammatical asymmetry of conditionals might seem to be 
problematic for the material conditional approach, in fact it may help us to explain 
one of the problems that the material conditional approach runs into. Consider the 
problem with negating a conditional. We saw above, in connection with example 
(4), repeated here, 
(4) a. It's not true that if the sun explodes tomorrow the earth won't be 
affected. 
b. The sun will explode tomorrow and the earth will be affected. 
that negating a conditional did not seem equivalent to asserting the second line of 
the truth table for ::J. Instead, in this case the negation seems to skip over the 
antecedent and attach itself to the consequent. However that could be due to facts 
particular to this and other similar examples, namely, that we know by way of real 
world knowledge that if the sun were to explode the earth would be affected. If 
we take a more neutral example, say (37): 
(37) It's not true that George will come to the party if Sue does. 
We see that the negation can be understood more weakly, as denying a connection 
between antecedent and consequent. The logical thing to suppose is that the 
stronger negation is inferred as an R-type implicature (in the sense of Hom 1984). 
Recall Frank Jackson's proposal, that robustness of the consequent with 
respect to the antecedent is a conventional implicature of indicative conditionals. 
Conventional implicatures do not generally fall within the scope of ordinary 
sentence negation. (38) 
(38) It's not the case that even George can solve the problem. 
is most naturally understood as conveying that George can't solve the problem, 
not that he's the least likely person to be able to solve it. However conventional 
implicatures may fall within the scope of metalinguistic negation (as may just 
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about anything else); conveyed by (38) with stress on even, and a continuation 
such as 
(38) a. . . .  he's the smartest person in the class! 
If we could find a way to argue that the negation of an indicative conditional is 
necessarily metalinguistic, then we would have an explanation for its effect. But 
if if clauses are root modifiers, then they should not be easily embeddable under a 
sentence operator. And note too that denial of a conditional does seem ordinarily 
to call for more of an explanation of what is intended, just as with metalinguistic 
negation. 
There is another potentially relevant fact here, which is that if the speaker 
of a negated conditional had intended to convey line 2 of the truth table, it would 
have been quicker and easier to say that. Negating a conditional as a whole 
requires the cumbersome It is not so/the case that . . .  locution, whereas asserting A 
and not-C does not. That means that when they choose the more cumbersome 
form, they must be wanting to convey something else, and denial of the 
robustness implicature (if Jackson is correct) would be the natural target. 
Are we home free then? Can we say that indicative conditionals express 
the truth conditions of the material conditional, but that they do it in an 
asymmetrical way, and that they also contain a conventional implicature to the 
effect of robustness of the consequent with respect to the antecedent? Well, 
probably not. 
6. Conventional or Conversational Implicature? 
There seem to be, unfortunately, problems for Jackson's conventional implicature 
approach. One is that it has the same problems with true and assertable 
conditionals with false antecedents that the other approaches do. To get around 
this problem Jackson would have to argue that somehow the robustness 
implicature is suspended in those cases or (possibly) that it shifts direction (from 
the negated consequent to the negated antecedent). 
But even if there were a way around that problem, there are others that 
arise specifically for the proposal of a conventional implicature. One is that we 
are not intuitively in touch with the robustness implicature proposed by Jackson. 
That's not the case with other examples of conventional implicatures, such as the 
meanings expressed by even, therefore, and but. In the latter cases we know what 
the words mean; it's just an issue of where in the total meaning package that bit of 
meaning goes. Whereas in the case of if there is so corresponding confidence. 
A third problem is that, as Edgington (200 1 )  has pointed out, examples 
where the putative implicature is contradicted do not strike us as possibly true 
anyway, unlike the case of clear conventional implicatures. So, while 
Edgington's example (39a) seems true but inappropriate, it's not obvious that the 
same can be said for (39b). 
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(39) a. 
b. 
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Even Godel understood truth-functional logic. 
If the Socialists win the next US election, they will eliminate health 
care coverage completely. 
The fact that the antecedent of (39b) is almost certainly false should make us 
think (39b) itself is almost certainly true, but simply misleading. However that is 
not the case. 
Each of these considerations might lead us to wonder whether Jackson's 
putative conventional implicature (or something like it) should not be regarded 
instead as a conversational implicature, as proposed by Grice (1989). The latter 
seems a priori more plausible: the implicature in question has the kind of meaning 
conversational implicatures do. It also seems quite parallel to a similar 
implicature for disjunctions cited by Jackson - namely, that each disjunct is 
robust with respect to the falsity of the other. 
Jackson took the Gricean line pretty crudely as saying simply "assert the 
stronger", and pointed out a number of cases in which conditionals are weaker 
(more probable) than, say, the negation of their antecedents, but are still 
assertable. One example is given in (40) (from Jackson 1979/1991, 113): 
(40) If the sun goes out of existence in ten minutes time, the earth will be 
plunged into darkness in about eighteen minutes time. 
But even though the denial of the antecedent is slightly less probable than the 
conditional as a whole, there are other factors that make it unassertable by itself 
(namely, the fact that everybody knows it's true), and hence allow for the 
felicitous assertion of the whole conditional. Another of Jackson's reasons for 
abandoning the Gricean line is that it puts conditionals on a par with disjunctions; 
but while it's possible (if infelicitous) to assert A or B on the basis of knowing 
that A is true, we do not, as we've seen, assert If A then B merely by knowing A is 
false. 
There is not time to pursue Jackson's objections to the Gricean line in 
detail here, and in any case there is a worse problem that may make the whole 
issue moot. Edgington, as we have seen, places great emphasis on the role of 
conditionals in thought. I've tried to suggest that that might not be a good basis 
for an analysis, but nevertheless it does seem to be true that we reason with them. 
But that raises the problem that any kind of Gricean explanation for the effects of 
conditionals beyond their truth conditions would have to apply at the level of 
belief. But Gricean implicatures arise through rules of conversation, hence do not 
apply to beliefs. As Edgington says: 
The difficulties with the truth-functional conditional cannot be 
explained away in terms of what is an inappropriate conversational 
remark. They arise at the level of belief. Believing that John is in the 
bar does not make it logically impermissible to disbelieve "if he's not 
in the bar he's in the library" ... Believing that the Queen is not at 
home, I may without irrationality reject the claim that if she's home, 
she will be worried about my whereabouts. (Edgington 1995, 245.) 
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This challenge remains to be met. 
7. Conclusion 
We have reviewed three kinds of approaches to the semantics (and pragmatics) of 
indicative conditionals, and found, for each of them, some difficult problems. I 
hope to have promoted the material conditional approach a bit, especially over its 
intensional rival, but it is clear that serious problems remain to be dealt with. 
Endnotes 
*A portion of section 3.4 of this paper is revised from prior presentations in Ann 
Arbor, November 2002; in East Lansing, December 2002; in Santa Barbara, 
February 2003; and at the LSA in Boston, January 2004. I am very grateful to 
Rich Hall, Larry Hauser, Larry Horn, Michael Jubien, Matt McKeon, and Carol 
Slater for reading and commenting on drafts of that portion, and to Tony 
Anderson, Gene Cline, Mutsuko Endo Hudson, Kai von Fintel, Sabine latridou, 
Myles McNally, Jeff Pelletier, and Rich Thomason for discussion following 
those presentations. I am also grateful to Chris Barker, Delia Graff, Stefan 
Kaufmann, Barbara Partee, and Paul Portner for comments after the SALT 
presentation. I regret not having had sufficient time to take into account these 
comments, and especially the work of Kaufmann (cf. Kaufmann 2001, 2003). In 
any case none of the people mentioned in this footnote should be held responsible 
for any faults in the current version of this paper. 
1 Since noticing this myself, I've discovered that Edgington mentions it in a 
footnote (1995, 288, n. 51). Note that although Kratzer declared that if-then is not 
a two-place logical connective, she apparently regarded this semantic fact as 
being at odds with the surface syntax. 
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